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During the last decade, considerable legislative activity has centered
around determining the proper roles of citizens in administrative decisionmaking. I The public bureaucracy is not a new setting for active participation
of private citizens. 2 However, citizen involvement has recently taken on a
new thrust. Especially in the area of decisions related to environmental
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THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
DiMento, Citizen EnvironmentalLegislation in the States: An Overview, 53 J. URB. L. 413
(1976) [hereinafter cited as DiMento, Overview].
I. For example, numerous states and the federal government have considered passage of
some version of the Model Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. See Sax &
DiMento Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the Michigan Environmental ProtectionAct, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3 n.6 (1974) (recent compilation of states which have
considered bills based on the Model Act). DiMento, Overview 457 summarizes the legislation in
states which have passed a version of the Model Act. For a sample of other types of citizen suit
legislation currently found in the states, see Figure 1 infra.
On the federal level, private citizens have been given powers to bring suit against the
administrators of several government agencies for failure to carry out certain statutory
mandates. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(Supp. V. 1975); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1970).
2. The literature on citizen participation in administrative agency activities is immense.
See, e.g., J GOODMAN & E. HANSON, AN EVALUATION OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH ON
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN MUNICIPAL SERVICE SYSTEMS: ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING (1974)

(NSF-RA-S-74-044H, Citizen Participation in Municipal Service Systems Analysis Project,
Monograph Number 8, prepared by Program in Health Planning, School of Public Health,
University of Michigan and the Technical Assistance Research Program Institute); D.HOEH,
PARTICIPATION AND THE PROPOSED A.L.I. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1975) (presented
at the 57th Annual Conference of the American Institute of Planners); A. SCOVILLE, CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT, A SUMMARY REPORT (1973) (prepared for the Office of
Exploratory Research and Problem Assessment, NSF-RANN, by the Citizen Participation
Project, The Environmental Planning Information Center, Montpelier, Vermont, Grant No.
GI-33647). See also Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened PublicParticipationin
the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972); Emond, Participationand the Environment: A Strategy for Democratizing Canada'sEnvironmental Protection Laws, 13 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 783 (1975); Forkosch, Administrative Conduct in Environmental Areas-A
Suggested Degree of Public Control, 12 S. TEX. L.J. 1 (1970); Hanes, Citizen Participationand
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quality, members of the public have lobbied for, and in many states have
been granted, participation in the decision-making process which is much
more direct and immediate than that which has been available through
traditional means. Unsatisfied with the results obtained through service on
advisory boards and commissions or by providing comments and opinions in
public hearings or rule-making proceedings, citizens have sought to have
their analyses and opinions injected into the public domain with the force of
law. Perhaps most significantly, they have urged their legislatures to grant
them the power to initiate law suits to present and vindicate their positions in
environmental management controversies. Private parties have attempted to
remove obstacles to judicial review of administrative actions and decisions
and to create new causes of action against legal entities in both the public
and private sectors.
Generally, citizens have sought to be permitted to initiate environmental lawsuits in two types of situations: they have demanded authority to
bring suits to challenge government efforts or failures to manage or regulate
the environment, and they have pressed for the right to sue other private
entities to enjoin the latter's activities on public or private lands which
violate specific statutory standards.
FIGURE I

A Continuum of Citizen Suit Legislation with Some State Examples
General environmental
cause of action
and broad procedural rights,

Litigation allowed upon
specified act or
omission by
government administrators or
private parties.

Litigation allowed in
specified geographic regions--"critical
area legislation."

Litigation allowed upon
specified act or
omission by
government administrators in
specified substantive regulatory arenas.

Litigation allowed in
specified regions upon act
or omission by
government administrators.

Michigan Environmental
Protection Act,
MICH. COMP.

New Jersey
Zoning Law,*
N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55 D-4
(West Supp.
1976)

Colo. Recreation Land Preservation Act,
COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 25-13101 to -114
(1974)
Cal. Coastal
Zone Initiative,

Mississippi Air
and Water Pollution Control
Act of 1966,
MISS. CODE
ANN. § 49-17-1
to -43 (1972)

California consistency
requirement,*
CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 65860
(West Supp.
1977)

LAWS ANN.

691.1201.1207 (Supp.
1975)

§§

CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30801

(West Supp.
1977)
* Indicates that the class of plaintiffs is circumscribed, such as by geographic location
(resident of city or county) or status (landowner).
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The states have varied in their responses to these demands and, consequently, in the legal status they accord to citizen-initiated legislation. As
Figure 1 suggests, 3 several approaches are identifiable. In the most responsive states (Michigan being the leader), citizens may bring suit to challenge
a wide range of public and private activities which are likely to affect the
state's natural resources. 4 A second group of states provides a more limited
right of private suit to protect specific ecologically valuable areas of the
state.' The most limited kind of citizen suit provision empowers individuals
6
to go to court to ensure the propriety of certain administrative actions.
Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible AdministrativeAction, 24 Sw. L.J. 731 (1970); Krier,
Environmental Watchdogs: Some Lessons frqm a "Study" Council, 23 STAN. L. REV. 623
(1971); Large, Is Anybody Listening?The Problem of Access in Environmental Litigation, 1972
Wis. L. REV. 62; Lenny, The Case for Funding Citizen Participationin the Administrative
Process, 28 AD. L. REV. 483 (1976); Lucas, Legal Foundationsfor Public Participationin
Environmental Decision Making, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J.73 (1976); Miller, Ecology and the
Administrative Process, 23 AD. L. REV. 59 (1970); Wandesforde-Smith, The Bureaucratic
Response to Environmental Politics, 11 NAT. RESOURCES J. 479 (1971); Wengert, Citizen
Participation:Practicein Search of a Theory, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 23 (1976).
3. The continuum is not claimed to be exhaustive of the range of legislative options in
providing for citizen environmental suits. Rather, it is presented as a heuristic and will be
modified upon completion of the research described in text accompanying notes 164-71 infra.
4. Environmental citizen suits gained much of their impetus from Michigan's passage of
its Environmental Protection Act in 1970. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207
(Supp. 1976). See also Sax & DiMento, supra note 1, at 1-3. Since then, at least eight other
states have followed Michigan's lead and enacted versions of the Model Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Act-the Sax Act, as it is commonly referred to in honor of its
author. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to 20 (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
403.412 (West 1973); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to-6 (Burns 1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 30, §§
61,62, ch. 214, § 10A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1973 & Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN, §§ 116B.01.13 (West Supp. 1977); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 41.540-.570 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-1
to-14 (West Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-I0A-I to-15 (Supp. 1976). California
has also enacted a version of the Sax Act. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12600-12612 (West Supp. 1977).
However, that Act does not confer standing on private individuals. California citizens wishing
to bring suits for environmental protection must act through the state attorney general. See id. §
12607; DiMento, Overview 415 n.6. A comparative table demonstrating the differences among
state acts can be found in DiMento, Overview 457 apps. B,C.
A recent listing of other states whose legislatures are currently considering versions of the
Model Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act is found in Sax & DiMento, supra
note 1,at 3 n.6. A bill has recently been introduced in Missouri which generally follows the
Model Act but provides for the initial attempt at resolution of environmental controversies to be
made by administrative agencies through standard regulatory channels. Mo. H.B. 623 (1977)
(introduced by Rep. Carl Muckler). Maine also has a version of the Sax Act under consideration. Me. Leg. Doc. 646 (1977) (introduced by Rep. William Blodgett).
There has also been some consideration of the Sax Act on the federal level. See S. 1104,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on S. 1104 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of
the Senate Subcomm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., ist Sess. (1973). See also H.R. 779, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (providing for environmental class actions).
5. Colorado, for example, allows citizens to initiate lawsuits where they have observed
abuses of recreational lands. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-13-112 (1974).
6. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1977). Under California's "consistency requirement," see id. § 65860(a), any "resident or property owner within a city or a county
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In many jurisdictions, environmental litigation by private citizens is
restricted to a strictly limited set of circumstances. Private parties are
frequently precluded from acting until specified land uses are proposed or
have begun, 7 identified government officials have taken particular actions or
have failed to act as legally required, 8 or prerequisites such as exhaustion of
administrative remedies have been met by the prospective citizen litigant. 9
A variety of substantive and procedural reforms have been developed
to circumvent these restrictive requirements. In some states, for example,

standing to sue has been liberalized so that environmental plaintiffs may
invoke the power of the courts without demonstrating the kind of actual
injury which is normally a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief. 10 Other
. . . may bring an action" to challenge zoning ordinances which are inconsistent with the
general plan. Id. § 65860(b).
7. See, e.g., id.
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412(2) (a) (West 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-17
(West Supp. 1976).
9. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412(2) (b) (West 1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(b)
(Burns 1973).
10. State standing doctrines often require an individual to be affected or harmed in a direct
and particular manner as a prerequisite to having a court hear his case. See generally Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 468-69 (1970). For examples of states
which have liberalized their standing requirements to eliminate the requirement of actual injury
when private parties seek to redress harms to the environment, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, §
22a-16 (West Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (Burns 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
691.1202(1) (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03(1) (West Supp. 1977).
Analyses of the standing doctrine generally and of the special problems of standing for
environmental plaintiffs have been voluminous. See Albert, Standing to ChallengeAdministrative Action: An InadequateSurrogatefor Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Allen, The
Problem of Standing to Sue and Public Involvement in FederalResource Management, 7 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 87 (1974); Cramton & Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field-Peril
or Promise?, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407 (1972); Eckhardt, Citizens Groups and Standing, 51 N.D.L.
REV. 359 (1974); Hughes, Who's standing?Problemswith Inanimate Plaintiffs, 4 ENVT'L L. 315
(1974); Large, supra note 2; McLennan, State Legislation to Grant Standing: Questions,
Answers and Alternatives, 2 ENVT'L L. 313 (1972); Rogers, The Alice-In-Wonderland World of
Standing, 1ENVT'L L. 169 (1971); Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?TowardLegal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Tremaine, Standing in the FederalCourtsfor
Conservation Groups, 6 URBAN LAW. 116 (1974); Note, Citizen Organizations Intervening in
Federal Administrative Proceedings: The Lingering Issue of Standing, 51 B.U. L. REV. 403
(1971); Comment, Standing in Environmental Litigation:LetIs Get to the Merits, 10 CAL. W.L.
REV. 182 (1973); Comment, ConstitutionalChallenge to the Price-Anderson Act: Ripeness and
Standing Before the Holocaust, 1976 DUKE L.J. 967; Comment, Standing on the Side of the
Environment: A Statutory Prescriptionfor Citizen Participation,I ECOLOGY L.Q. 561 (1971);
Comment, Standing and Administrative Agencies-Expanding Concepts of JudicialReview, 32
LA. L. REV. 634 (1972); Note, Standing: Who Speaks for the Environment?, 32 MONT. L. REV.
130 (1971); Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of
Environmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1070 (1970); Note, Standing to Sue Under the
Model Land Development Code, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 649 (1976); Note, Environmental
Protection:A Limited Expansion of the Citizen's Role, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 54 (1972). It is not the
purpose of this Article to present any new analysis of standing or its reforms, but only to
discuss some remaining conceptual difficulties with expanded standing for environmental
plaintiffs. See text accompanying notes 77-95 infra.
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states have legislated substantive legal rights or general standards of environmental protection which citizens are empowered to enforce through the
courts. 1 Under such provisions, the courts may measure the legality of an
action of a public- or private-sector defendant against a standard that has not
been operationalized in any specified state law or administrative regulation. 12 A number of states have focused their reform efforts on enlarging the
scope of judicial review of administrative actions. Some jurisdictions have
provided for expansive judicial scrutiny through citizen-initiated suits, in
response to which courts are authorized to substitute their views for those of
13
administrative agencies.
With these procedural and substantive innovations, the potential for
citizen involvement in the processes of environmental regulation and control
is considerable. But a wide range of opinion exists as to the desirability of
admitting the individual citizen to a more active role in the resolution of
environmental controversies. Perceived effects of citizen suits are classified
and weighted differently by lawyers, environmental and administrative law
professors, and the state and local goernment administrators and judges
who adjudicate citizen-initiated controversies. These perceived effects have
been summarized, clustered and presented in Tables 1 and 2.
It is not the purpose of this work to explicate the various arguments for
or against citizen suits. These arguments have been presented in detail
elsewhere. 14 Rather, this Article will explore some of the remaining issues
which face those who must consider the use of citizen litigation as a vehicle
for involving the public in the policy-making process. Such factors as
administrative efficiency, democratic participation and the difficult-todescribe but critically important need to arrive at a concept of the public
interest, must all be examined.
In order to pursue this task, the remainder of this Article is divided into
three parts. The first section presents some of the empirical work completed
on citizen environmental litigation and its impact on administrative functioning, including the administration of the judiciary. Particular emphasis is
given to those studies which may be useful in assessing the validity of the
arguments for and against citizen suits which have been set forth in Tables 1
II. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (West 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
116B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1976).
12. Consider, for example, the Model Act as it has been adopted in Michigan. The statute
grants a broad right of action to any legal entity "for the protection of the air, water and other
natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction."
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1976); accord, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16

(West 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116b.0 (West 1977).
13. These statutes may allow for de novo review of agency actions. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 22a-18(c) (West 1975); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(2) (Supp. 1976); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 41.540-.570 (1973).
14. 'See DiMento, Overview 418-27.
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1

Propositionsfrom the Legal Literaturein Support of EnvironmentalCitizen Suit Provisions
1. Administrative agencies become inordinately responsive over time to the special
interests in society that they are created to regulate or assist. Rather than working
for the public interest, the daily operations of administrative agencies promote
private vested interests and discourage citizen participation. Citizen environmental
suits make visible the "insider perspective" which dominates decision-making in
the agencies. Citizen suits thus: first, expose questionable decision-making approaches in defendant agencies to public view, and second, subject agencies in
general to the scrutinizing overview of interested private citizens. In short, citizen
environmental suits serve functions analogous to special and general deterrence.'
2. Some decision-making on environmental matters should be shifted to the courts, for
the judiciary is well equipped to analyze value-laden environmental problems
objectively and to engage in the delicate balancing processes required to reach
sound decisions in a pluralistic society.b
3. Existing state and local administrative structures cannot respond adequately to
complex environmental controversies. These controversies and decisions are not
readily amenable to solutions in single-purpose government agencies or in understaffed, jurisdictionally irrational and non-representative local governments. Citizen environmental suits force complex decisions into the better-equipped judicial
setting.c
4. Environmental decisions often take far too long to emerge from the present decision
structure. Unlike the administrative process, the judicial process is inexorable: once
the process is begun through the filing of a complaint, subsequent action is
inevitable-if not always rapid. No gaps are left which a discretionary determination by an administrator can turn into a termination of the decision-making process
and a decision by default.d
5. Traditional law on judicial review places the citizen concerned with environmental
management in a highly disadvantageous position vis-a-vis administrative agencies.
In order to effectuate the shift of some environmental decision-making to the courts,
expanded judicial review of administrative agency decisions should be permitted.
This is necessary because under the substantial evidence-rational basis rule, environmentalists are faced with onerous burdens.'
6. Citizen environmental litigation actively involves citizens in the process of environmental management; it promotes citizen satisfaction with decisions reached by
government.f
a. See J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 56-57 (1971); Lenny, The Case for Funding Citizen
Participation in the Administrative Process, 28 AD L. REV. 483, 490-94 (1976); Murphy & Hoffman, Current
Models for Improving Public Representation in the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L. REV. 391,392-96 (1976);
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV.
471, 495-96 (1970); Comment, Standing in Environmental Litigation: Let's Get to the Merits, 10 CAL. W.L.
REV. 182, 183-84 (1973), Comment, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescription for
Citizen Participation, I ECOLOGY L.Q. 561, 567-74 (1971); Comment, Environmental Protection: Citizen
Action Forcing Agency Compliance Under Limited Judicial Rewiew, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421, 433-36, 440

(1974); Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with Problems ofEnvironmental Quality, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1070, 1098-99 (1970).

b. See J. SAX, supra note a at 149-57; Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the
Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629-31 (1970); Sive, The Role of Litigation in

EnvironmentalPolicy: The Power Plant Siting Problem, II NAT. REsoURCES J. 467,470-71 (1971); Smith, The
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TABLE 2

Propositionsfrom the Literaturein Opposition to Environmental Citizen Suit Provisions
Lawsuits engender great delays in environmental and land use decisions, which can
be more expeditiously made by competent local officials.5
2. The introduction of the citizen suit results in clogging of court calendars. Great
volumes of environmental litigation force courts to adjudicate in areas where they
are least competent, or at least in areas of secondary importance
when compared
h
with those with which courts are more traditionally involved.
3. The court is not a good forum for the resolution of "polycentric" problems. These
involve "a complex of decisions, judgment upon each of which depends upon the
judgment to be made upon each of the others." Court procedures, including those of
pleading, evidence evaluation and remedy choice are not compatible with the
flexibility needed for response to complex, multifaceted problems. In addition,
proper environmental decision-making is highly political in nature; moving political
questions toi the judiciary casts doubt on the decisions made and the courts
themselves.
4. Rather than adding another factor into a management process in need of new
perspectives, citizen suits provide the means by which litigious individuals can
harass government agencies and promoters of unpopular land uses. These abuses
result in-among other outcomes-movement of industry from those jurisdictions
which grant citizens litigation power. Adverse statewide economic consequences
follow.i
5. The judiciary, to which environmental decisions are shifted by citizen suits, is not
as accountable to the public as legislatures and administrative agencies. Administrative agencies and local government are amenable to lobbying and other legitimate
means of allowing the participation of many groups interested in the complicated
decisions of environmental planning.k
6. Citizen-initiated lawsuits impede rational long-range planning, policy formulation
and regulation. Regardless of motivation, non-experts lack skills needed to address
the questions which guide natural resource allocation. Litigation based on narrow
understandings of societal needs, far from fostering improvements in a generally
workable planning process, tends to divert the attention of administrators to individual controversies; balkanization of regulatory law may ensue.'
7. Citizen suit statutes impose extremely vague standards for environmental control
and therefore force the judiciary to make decisions which are technically difficult or
constitutionally suspect. Existing standards for judicial review provide sufficient
judicial intervention into administrative environmental decision-making. De novo
review would result in misuse of governmental resources.m
excessively expensive, both for government agen8. Citizen environmental suits are
n
cies and for private litigants.
1.

Environment and the Judiciary: A Need for Cooperation or Reform?, 3 ENVT'L AFF. 627, 639 (1974);
Comment, Standingon the Side of the Environment:A Statutory Prescriptionfor Citizen Participation,supra
note a, at 640-41.
c. See J. SAX, supra note a, at 58-62; Forkosch, Administrative Conduct in Environmental Areas-A
Suggested Degree of Public Control, 12 S. TEx. L.J. 1, 2-7 (1970); Murphy & Hoffman, supra note a, at
393-96.
d. See J. SAX, supra note a, at 116-24; Comment, Standingon the Side of the Environment:A Statutory
Prescriptionfor CitizenParticipation,supra note a, at 576 n.57; P. Schroth & Z. Plater, Environmental Law:
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and 2. Section two attempts to frame some of the questions which remain
unanswered by currently available empirical and conceptual work. In section three, some research directions for the future-issues for both legal
research and scientific fieldwork-are suggested. Each of the questions
posed by this last section is regularly confronted by the practicing attorney,
the citizen litigant and the administrative agency.
Before beginning, it must be emphasized that while the focus of this
analysis is on citizen involvement in environmental policy-making, the
concepts and data presented are not necessarily limited in applicability to
that area. Environmental policy has been selected on the basis of current
interest and rapid development. But the general issues discussed and the
conceptual framework developed should be equally applicable in considering methods for involving the public in other spheres of policy.
I.

CITIZEN SUITS: SOME EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Few systematic studies have investigated the impact of citizen involvement on public actions. In general, the literature on public participation in
government decision-making "has tended to be prescriptive and hortatory,
abounding with rhetoric and polemics and resting on unanalyzed premises
and assumptions." 15 The literature on the effects of citizen litigation has
been no exception. There have been few systematic studies and much of the
analysis that has been undertaken has been unsupported by empirical fact.
Fortunately, there are several studies which allow some preliminary assess15. Wengert, supra note 2, at 24.
An Introduction to the American Legal System (1973) (unpublished fifth preliminary edition of textbook used
at Universities of Michigan, Tennessee and California, Oberlin College and Southern Methodist University).
e. See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law,
supra note b, at 619. Several of these arguments have been made in analyses of proposed federal provisions,
but they are, for the most part, equally applicable to reforms in the states.
f. See Sax & Conner, Michigan'sEnvironmental ProtectionAct of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICII.
L. REV. 1103, 1080-81 (1972).
g. See Cramton, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field-Peril or Promise?, 25 AD. L. REV. 147,
153-55 (1973); Leventhal, Environmental Decision-making and the Role of the courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509,
518-19 (1974).
h. See Cramton, supra note g, at 151; Cramton &Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril
or Promise?, 2'EcOLoGY L.Q. 407, 412 (1972).
i. See Cramton, supra note g, at 151-52; Cramton & Boyer, supra note h, at 412; Leventhal, supra note
g, at 545-50.
j. See Cramton, supra note g, at 150.
k. See Cramton, supra note g, at 151-52; Hanes, Citizen Participation and Its Impact upon Prompt and
Responsible Administrative Action, 24 Sw. L.J. 731, 736 (1970).
I. See Cramton, supra note g, at 153-55; Cramton & Boyer, supra note h, at 416-17; Hanes, supra note
k, at 738-39; Jaffe, Ecological Goals and the Ways and Means ofAchieving Them, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 1,23-24
(1972).
m. See Cramton, supra note g, at 154-55; Cramton & Boyer, supra note h, at 419-22; Jaffe, The
Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 231, 234-35 (1970); Hearings on the
Environmental Protection Act of 1973 (5. 1104) Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. 51 (1973).
n. See Cramton & Boyer,-supra note h, at 417-19.
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ments of the arguments advanced for and against citizen suit legislation. The

results of some of these are outlined below.
A.

Influence of Special Interests

Reports on the federal system have documented considerable movement in and out of federal regulatory agency staffs by industry representatives and overrepresentation of certain private interest groups on federal
advisory committees. 1 6 These reports provide circumstantial support for the
now-familiar proposition that many regulatory agencies are inordinately
responsive to the special interests in society which they are created to
regulate. 17 To the extent that agency decision-making is dominated by
vested interests, the argument for citizen suits is clear. Such suits may
expose questionable decision-making approaches in government agencies to
public view and subject agencies to public oversight through the courts. 18
B.

Judicial Competence in Complex Issues

The question of whether the courts are the proper forum for resolution
of complex, value-laden issues, such as those found in environmental
management, is critical to determining whether the citizen suit is actually a
desirable vehicle for keeping agencies responsive to the public. 19 The
history of litigation under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) 20 is instructive. An early study reported that the judiciary was responding capably to the complex environmental matters presented in suits brought
under MEPA in its first three years. 2 ' Judges were perceived by both
16. See, e.g. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 746, 748 n.7 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Hearings on S.3067 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-27, 49-70 (1970) (testimony
of W. Rogers & T. Kimball). For a discussioin of the ethical problems posed by this movement,
see Note, Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or
Individual Disqualification?, 1977 DUKE L.J. 512.
17. See, e.g., G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1967).
18. See generally J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971); DiMento, Overview 419-20;
Lenny, supra note 2; Murphy & Hoffman, CurrentModels for Improving PublicRepresentation
in the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L. REV. 391 (1976); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
NaturalResources Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Comment,
Environmental Protection:Citizen Action ForcingAgency Compliance UnderLimited Judicial
Review, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421 (1974).
19. Compare note b in Table 1 and accompanying text with note i in Table 2 and accompanying text. For the contrasting views of two able federal judges on the desirability and
soundness of judicial review in cases involving complex scientific and technical issues, compare the majority opinion of Judge Leventhal with the concurring opinion of Chief Judge
Bazelon in Internatonal Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also
comments by Judge James L. Oakes of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit before a
conference of the ALI-ABA-ELI, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C. (February 11,
1977).
20. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1976).
21. See Sax & DiMento, supra note I, at 52.
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plaintiffs and defendants as being quite able to understand and handle
environmental, scientific and technical issues,22 and as generally neutral or
23
sympathetic to MEPA goals.
C.

Effects on Judicial Calendars

Another issue which is critical in evaluating whether the courts are a
proper forum for environmental matters concerns the relative speed and
inexorability of administrative and judicial decision-making. 24 Several commentators have suggested that increased access to the judicial process could
mitigate the twin dangers of detrimental delay in decision or decision by
default which frequently characterize the administrative process. 25 The basis
of this view is the supposedly inexorable nature of the judicial system. Once
a complaint is filed, action on it is assumed to be inevitable. At the very
least, this characteristic should preclude decision by default. The validity of
this argument can be tested by investigating the degree to which citizen
environmental suits, once initiated, are carried through to judicial resolution
as opposed to being settled between the parties or dropped. Again the
Michigan analysis sheds some light on the question. According to the latest
reported figures, of the 119 suits commenced since 1970, the year in which
MEPA became effective, eighty-six (72%) are no longer pending. Of these,
seventy-five (85%) have been resolved judicially, and eleven cases (15%)
were not pursued. 26 While these figures do suggest that judicial resolution of
citizen environmental litigation has been the rule, they are, of course,
insufficient to support any firm conclusions. This is particularly true be22. On the question of whether judges were "able to understand and handle the environmental, scientific [and] technical issues," plaintiffs and defendants answered yes by margins of
2 to I and 12 to 1, respectively. Id.
23. Id. To put the significance of the study in context, it should be noted that the research

was undertaken relatively early in the history of MEPA and that no systematic effort to tap
judicial sentiment was attempted, Questionnaires were sent to the attorneys for plaintiffs and
defendants in cases litigated under MEPA, but no judges were surveyed directly. For other
caveats in interpreting the data, see id. at 51-52. See text accompanying notes 164-71 infra for a
discussion of a proposed systematic study of the administrative and judicial impact of state
citizen environmental litigation.
24.

See DiMento, Overview 422-24. Compare note d in Table I and accompanying text with

notes g & h in Table 2 and accompanying text.
25. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 18; Note, Citizen Organizations
Intervening in FederalAdministrative Proceedings:The LingeringIssue of Standing, supra note
10; Comment, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescription for Citizen
Participation,supra note 10; P. Schroth & Z. Plater, Environmental Law: An Introduction to
the American Legal System (1973) (unpublished fifth preliminary edition of textbook used at
Universities of Michigan, Tennessee and California, Oberlin College and Southern Methodist
University).
26. Haynes, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act in its Sixt

Vol. 1977:4091

CITIZEN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION

419'

cause of the lack of any comparable data on resolution rates in administra27
tive agencies.
Those who oppose citizen environmental suit legislation assert that
lawsuits will cause great delays in the agency decisional process 28 and will
needlessly burden already crowded court dockets.2 9 Little information is
currently available at the state level which can be used to assess the impact
of citizen suits on the administration of justice. The Michigan study has
found that the mean duration of MEPA cases is eleven months in the trial
courts. 30 When appeals are included, this average increases to almost one
31
year.
The federal level provides another relevant set of statistics. 32 In a recent
report on the feasibility of establishing a federal environmental court, 33 the
General Services Administration indicated that while less than 2% of the
cases awaiting adjudication by GSA involved significant environmental
issues, "[t]hese seven cases [representing the 2% figure] are among the
most significant cases involving this agency and are most time-consuming
and complex. 3 4 While the report did not specify how many of these actions
were citizen-initated, 35 the GSA's experience does reflect the burden which
environmental cases can impose on government resources.
Calendar impact is a function of volume as well as duration of citizen
environmental suits. Some studies have attempted to measure the volume of
environmental suits, but few generate high levels of confidence in the results
because of the absence of scientific design in investigation. The Attorney
General's report indicated that less than seven-tenths of one percent (0.7%)
27. Data on the parallel activity in administrative agencies have not been assembled, to the
author's knowledge, except in anecdotal fashion. See P. Schroth & Z. Plater, supra note 25, at
17.26-.28, for some interesting examples of administrative agency "inaction" in the environ-

mental field.
28. See, e.g., Cramton, Citizen Suits in the EnvironmentalField-PerilorPromise?,25 AD.
L. REV. 147, 153-54 (1973); Hanes, supra note 2, at 738; Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 541 (1974).

29. See Cramton & Boyer, supra note 10, at 415-19.
30. Haynes, supra note 26, at 595. This appears to be the only available recent report of
systematically collected data on the duration of litigation in the states. The author would
appreciate being informed by readers of empirical studies on environmental litigation's impact

on court administration.
31. Id. The median duration of cases involving an appeal is 10 months and the range is I to
46 months. Id. at 596.
32. There are, of course, some problems in using conclusions drawn from the federal
experience in discussing state legislative proposals. The size of the federal bureaucracy and the

variations between state and federal procedural safeguards require that such interpolations be
viewed with some care.
33.

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON THE FEASI-

BILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM (1973).

34. Id. at 111-6.
35. The REPORT discusses the impact of environmental litigation on the federal bureaucracy. Id. at III-I to 111-13.
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of the total case load in the federal courts could be classified as environmental litigation. 36 However, the study failed to use a uniform definition of
"environmental litigation. " 37
Several studies of the volume of environmental law suits have been
undertaken at the state level. Michigan continues to be the state with the
most ambitious effort to count its environmental law suits. 3 8 As of March
1976, litigation initiated under MEPA accounted for less than 119 of the
over 600,000 civil actions brought in the Michigan circuit courts during the
sixty-five month study period.3 9 Seventeen of the 119 involved appellate
proceedings, 40 and the Michigan Supreme Court has ruled in five MEPA
cases." Studies of the use of the California consistency requirement42
indicate that the volume of citizen-initiated litigation-again as distinguished from the duration-is small.4 3 Although the reported litigation under
the California Environmental Quality Act" has been fairly frequent, 45 a
preliminary analysis of the most recent of the California Judicial Council
Reports 46 indicates that only a small percentage of California litigation
involves citizen-initiated environmental suits.
The extent to which agency action is delayed as a result of actual
litigation or the threat of litigation is difficult to assess. In its recently issued
comprehensive study of the National Environmental Policy Act, 47 the Coun36. Of the 136,205 civil and criminal cases pending in federal courts (some of which may
have been counted twice because they are listed as pending in both district and appellate court),

844 may be classified as environmental. Id. at 111-12; environmental suits represent .3% (270) of
the 98,560 new civil suits filed between July 1, 1972 and June 30, 1973 in the district courts and

.6% of the 15,629 new filings in appellate courts. Id. at 111-9.
37. See Kiechel, Environmental Court Vel Non, 3 ENVT'L L. REP. 50013 (1973). Also, the
data do not indicate the number of suits initiated by citizens based on citizen environmental
legislation.
38. Outside of Michigan, only a handful of suits brought under the Sax Act have been
reported. DiMento, Overview 433 n.95
39. Haynes, supra note 26, at 593. The "less than" modifier is used because some of the

cases involved administrative proceedings.
40. Id. at 592-93.
41. Id. at 593.
42. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1977) requires consistency between zoning
ordinances and general plans and provides for citizen suits to enforce this requirement. See
note 6 supra.
43. Two questionnaire studies undertaken at the University of California, Irvine by this
author and the Public Policy Research Organization indicate that the number of suits brought
under the consistency provision has been small. As of the time of publication of this Article,
only a handful of suits have been brought to the attention of the author.
44. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§21000-21165 (West Supp. 1977).
45. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT LITIGATION STUDY (1976).
46. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE LEGISLATURE; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA

COURTS (1976) (PTs. I & 2).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§4331-4335 (1970).
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cil on Environmental Quality concludes that "court action has contributed
toward agencies taking the [environmental impact statement] process seriously in their planning and decision-making, but major unnecessary delays
48
in federal actions have been ascribed to litigation in NEPA issues."
Examination of the data which underlie these conclusions suggests that the
number of serious delays was small. In the five and one-half years analyzed,
federal agencies prepared over 6,000 impact statements. 49 During that same
period, only 654 suits were brought by private parties under NEPA. 50 In 363
of these, the claim was made that an impact statement was required but had
not been completed. In most of the remaining suits, the adequacy of the
statement was challenged. Of the 654 suits that had been started under the
Act, over half (333) had been concluded by the time of the Council's
study. 52 Fully one-sixth of the complaints had been dismissed at the trial
54
level; 53 the ultimate disposition of the other cases often took several years.
Four cases resulted in the issuance of permanent injunctions, but in no case
was agency action enjoined beyond the time of the agency's compliance
with NEPA.5 5
D. Economic Costs
Another important issue which has yet to be fully analyzed is the
economic impact of state legislation giving the public greater power over
environmental decisions.5 6 One argument lodged against citizen suits is that
they provide a means for litigious individuals to harrass ,government agencies and promoters of unpopular land uses. 57 Such abuses, the argument
continues, may force industry to leave or to avoid locating in jurisdictions
which provide private parties with environmental causes of action and may
therefore have adverse effects on the state economy.5 8 The difficulties of
defining the problem and designing a scientific study to determine whether
48. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES 2 (1976). For a

discussion of some of the legal problems which have arisen with respect to NEPA, see Note,

Appropriate Scope of an Environmental Impact Statement: The Interrelationshipof Impacts,
1976 DUKE L.J. 623.
49. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 48, at 32.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.at 31.
Id.
See id.at 31-32.
See id.
Id.at 32.
Id.
For a discussion of the impact of federal environmental legislation on a number of

economic indicators, see U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1976, at 147-65 (1976).

57. See DiMento, Overview 424. But see id, at 428-30 (suggesting that actual experience
does not bear out this expectation).
58. See Cramton, supra note 28, at 150.
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citizen environmental suits may induce industry to leave a jurisdiction are
considerable.5 9 However, data collected in a 1975 mail survey in states
which have passed versions of the Sax Act 6° provide little evidence of an
exodus of6 1 industry from states with strong citizen environmental
legislation.
As to the direct costs of environmental litigation, the most comprehensive data available are from Michigan, and they remain sketchy. Plaintiffs
can expect to pay two thousand dollars or more for cases pursued without a
trial, and as much as ten thousand dollars for cases that go to trial. 62
Summary: A Need for Comparative Analysis

E.

The scarcity of empirical work done on the actual impact of the passage
and use of citizen environmental legislation clearly suggests the need for
further systematic studies. A nationwide analysis of the potential and actual
use of the citizen environmental suit would help to clarify many issues. For
the time being, the available data permit the following tentative
observations:
(1) There is some evidence that government agencies may be
inordinately responsive to the special interests that they are
created to regulate.
(2) The courts appear to be capable of responding well to the
kinds of complex issues which arise in environmental
litigation.
(3) The courts do appear actually to force resolution (by adjudi'cation or settlement) of a large percentage of the matters
brought to their attention.
(4) While their volume is relatively low compared to the large
number of civil cases presently heard by state and federal
courts, citizen environmental suits can be time-consuming.
They may require use of substantial government resources
and may delay some government actions.
(5) Private litigants may be forced to expend fairly large amounts
of money in pursuing environmental suits, but there is no
evidence at present that the threat of citizen suits has any
broader economic impact on such things as industrial
location.
59. The interaction of this factor with other variables in companies' decision-making
processes may confuse the issue considerably. -See generally Heckert, Metropolitan Fiscal
Disparities-TheBusiness Point of View, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 336 (1976).

60. See note 4 supra.
61.

DiMento, Overview 443 n.160.

62. Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental ProtectionAct of 1970: A ProgressReport,
70 MICH. L. REV. 1003, 1051 (1972).
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Thus, citizen suits seem capable of circumventing some current problems in
environmental policy-making with relatively small, costs. A more difficult
problem arises, however, in determining whether such suits are the best
means of obtaining public participation in the policy-making process.
II.

SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES

While empirical research would be useful in evaluating the efficiency
of citizen suit legislation, there are also many questions on which data-based

responses would not be helpful. A variety of values and organizational
factors must also be considered in determining when public participation is
important and when citizen suits are an appropriate means of achieving that
goal. Examination of these values and factors is a necessary prerequisite to
the development of a conceptual structure on which future discussion and
empirical research can be based.
A.

Why is Environmental Decision-making Special?

To begin with, the same threshold question must be addressed in
determining whether any particular area of decision-making-in this case
environmental decision-making-requires special legislation to facilitate
public involvement: Why should the values in that particular policy area be
treated uniquely? Focusing more specifically on environmental management, this threshold inquiry concerns the extent to which environmental
values should be treated differently from other societal interests. It is useful
to begin the examination of this question by scrutinizing the arguments for
expanding the scope of judicial review of environmental decisions and the
right to seek such review.
1. Expansive Judicial Review? In arguing that decisions affecting
the environment should be subject to particularly thorough judicial review,
environmentalists contend that agency insensitivities to environmental concerns and values put them in a highly unfavorable position for influencing
63
the administrative process.
David Sive, a noted environmental lawyer, has pointed out several
disadvantages which face the conservationist or environmentalist who seeks
to overturn an administrative rule. The environmental plaintiff suffers all the
64
handicaps of any small plaintiff facing a large, well-established defendant.
He or she characteristically suffers from a lack of resources relative to the
63. The administrative law arena has been characterized as a "wilderness" by environmental lawyers-with a negative connotation not usually associated with use of that term by

conservationists. See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
AdministrativeLaw, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970).
64. See id. at 618.
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opponent and the fact that important information is often in the possession of
the defendant administrative agency. 65 These problems are often aggravated
by time pressures and governmental immunities which prevent discovery of
such critical information as the opinions of defendant's experts. 66 Sive also
argues that the environmentalist should be treated differently because challenges to environmental decisions serve an important social function. 67 In
addition to helping to provide public oversight for administrative actions,
citizen suits can bring important information to bear on the novel and
complex issues which frequently arise in environmental policy-makingissues which are often so new that administrative agencies have not yet
proven their expertise to analyze them. 68 Finally, Sive suggests that environmental plaintiffs should be given special advantages simply because of the
"sheer importance" of the interest at issue-'"the restoration and maintenance of a livable environment.' '69
Several questions are raised by this analysis which are directly relevant
to the investigation of the need for environmental citizens suit legislation.
The first is the extent to which environmental litigants differ objectively
from other potential plaintiffs who zealously espouse values felt by them to
be especially deserving of judicial protection. To the extent that provision of
equal housing opportunity is not categorized as an environmental issue, it is
certainly an example of such an issue. Are not plaintiffs who seek housing
for all, even at the expense of environmental quality, performing tasks of
some social importance? Are they not typically without means? Are not the
issues they raise new? 70 Undoubtedly there are at least a small number of
other citizen interest groups which would claim to meet each aspect of the
Sive test.
A second question arises as to whether the assumptions upon which
Sive bases his reform suggestions are accurate. For example, Sive emphasizes the problems which may arise from excessive pressures of time. He
states that in "the typical environmental litigation . . . the aroused citizens
group turns to the court as a last resort, after every political measure has
failed. The suit is usually begun, figuratively speaking, in the shadow of the
bulldozer
. ."71 This is an assertion which can be tested empirically.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 619. See generally NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck, 421 U.S. 132 (1975); 5 U.S.C. §

552a(b) (5) (1970).
67.

Sive, supra note 63, at 617-18.

68. Cf. id. at 625. Such issues continue to arise in environmental law. See generally
Johnson, Enforcing the FederalWater Resource Servitude on Submerged and Riparian Lands,
1977 DUKE L.J. 347.
69. Sive, supra note 63, at 615.
70. -For an example of the novel questions which may arise in the context of equal
opportunity in housing, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
71. Sive, supra note 63, at 618.
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Clearly it is true for many legitimate environmental cases. 72 Its correctness
is less obvious, however, for the wide variety of actions which fall under the
general rubric of citizen environmental suits. Challenges to environmental
impact statements or construction or development plans often occur well in
advance of any actual groundbreaking. In sum, it is simply not clear to what
extent expanded judicial review is more necessary73 to protect the environment than it is to safeguard other social interests.
2. Liberalized Standing. Similar difficulties arise in examining the
rationale for granting environmentalists differential treatment in the form of
liberalized standing requirements. Generally, the law of standing requires
that an individual be affected, aggrieved or harmed in some tangible way as
a prerequisite to seeking judicial remedies.74 The standing issue determines
whether the complainant is a proper party to bring suit. To the extent that a
party must be able to allege actual injury, it can be and has been argued that
it will be difficult to challenge activities that are detrimental to the environment. 75 A dramatic alteration in an area's ecosystem may result in serious
changes in animal and plant life without any concomitant individualized
injury that will prompt single individuals to undertake the expense of
litigating the issue. Similar problems arise in cases where injury will be
individualized
irreparable once it has occurred, but no party has any special,
76
mishap.
environmental
the
before
injury
of
likelihood
These conceptual problems and the general need for liberalized standing requirements have been discussed elsewhere in great detail. 77 The reader
has been asked to consider standing, standing again, 78 standing on the side
8
of the environment, 79 and even standing for trees and other natural objects. "
72. Consider, for example, the controversial case involving cutting of trees at the entrance
to Michigan State University for road-widening purposes. Anderson v. State Highway
Comm'n, No.15609 (Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich., filed June 27, 1973).
73. Mr. Sive has recently noted that "political shifts" in the past few years may have
diminished the force of some of his earlier observations (i.e., Sive, supra note 63). In com-

ments prepared for the ALI-ABA-ELI-Smithsonian Institution Conference on Environmental
Law, D. Sive, "Environmental Litigation, Some of its Special Aspects and Developments

During 1976" (Feb. 10, 1977) (conference held in Washington, D.C.), Mr. Sive noted that the
inequality of information and means between plaintiffs and defendants does not apply only to
environmental controversies. Further, he noted that as a result of recently passed environmental legislation, certain industrial interests wish to expand the scope of judicial review, whereas
environmentalists may wish to limit its scope. For Mr. Sive's most recently published comments on environmental litigation, see Sive, Foreword: Roles and Rules in Environmental
Decision-making, 62 IOWA L. REV. 637 (1977).

74. See Davis, supra note 10, at 468. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
75. See authorities cited in note 10 supra.
76. See Comment, Constitutional Challenge to the Price-Anderson Act: Ripeness and
Standing Before the Holocaust, supra note 10, at 970.
77. See articles cited in note 10 supra.
78. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971).
79. Comment,Standing on the Side of the Environment, supra note 10.
80. The article by Stone, supra note 10, has received considerable judicial, scholarly and
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Conceptually, there is little left to be said. 8 ' But what does need to be
analyzed by those considering passage of citizen suit legislation is the extent
of the need for special rules of standing for environmental plaintiffs and the
potential impact of such reforms on the courts and agencies.
Regardless of the restrictiveness of the law of standing in a particular
jurisdiction, important questions remain as to whether it is necessary or
desirable to legislate standing for the so-called ideological plaintiff who
asserts interests based solely on philosophic or religious principles 82 and is
currently denied standing for failure to allege "injury in fact."8 ' Several
issues must be considered: Are there factual situations which require resort
to the ideological plaintiff for protection of some environmental value? Is
the ideological plaintiff actually being denied standing by the courts? What
are the reasons for and the implications of creating standing for the
ideologue whose primary interest is the environment?
First, there is some question as to whether responsible plaintiffs are
being barred from seeking judicial review of environmental decisionmaking because of the absence of any explicit legislative or judicial expansion of the standing doctrine. Two years after the Supreme Court's decision
to refuse the Sierra Club standing to challenge construction of a ski resort in
a national game refuge because of the a lack of any allegation of a specific
individualized injury, 4 District of Columbia Circuit Judge Malcolm Wilkey
wrote that he was unable to find a single case in which his court had
public attention. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742-43 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Hughes, Who's Standing? Problems with Inanimate Plaintiffs, supra note 10, at
318-23.

81. Important questions remain as to the effects which such recent federal decisions as
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977), may have for environmental plaintiffs. See also Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974). However, the federal trend has been discussed at length. See, e.g., DiMento,

Overview 417 n. 16; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1734-47 (1975); Comment, Constitutional Challenge to the Price-Anderson Act:

Ripeness and Standing Before the Holocaust, supra note 10, at 972-85.
To the extent that a jurisdiction has adopted the liberalized standing rules of the federal
courts, the discussion of the need for standing reform focuses on the desirability of permitting

purely ideological plaintiffs to sue. To the extent that a state follows more traditional rules,
such as the requirement of a legally protected interest or economic injury, more fundamental
considerations must also be examined. A discussion of such basic concepts can be found in K.
DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 22.04-.08 (3d ed. 1972).

82. See Stewart, supra note 81, at 1734.
83. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See note 84 infra.
84. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-39 (1972):

[B]roadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a
different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must
himself have suffered injury. . . .[A] mere "interest in a problem," no matter how
longstanding the interest . . . is not sufficient by itself to render the organization
"adversely affected" or "aggrieved .... "
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disposed of an environmental claim on standing grounds.8 5 While it is
unclear whether other jurisdictions have had similar experiences, it does
appear that the need for special rules of standing for the benefit of ideological plaintiffs will arise relatively infrequently, "if only because a class
action plaintiff's lawyer, a 'public interest' lawyer, or an organization such
as the Sierra Club will normally be able to locate a plaintiff or allege injury
to an organization member, who satisfies the expanding definition of legally
protected material interest.''86
Where an appropriate plaintiff cannot be found, at least two questions
arise as to the effect which liberalized standing may have on the administration of justice. To begin with, liberalized standing for ideological plaintiffs
may affect the traditional role of the courts. As Professor Stewart has
explained:
There may

.

. .

be instances where only an ideological plaintiff,

direct or surrogate, will suffice to secure representation of important
affected interests. For example, there might be cases of environmental
degradation in remote wilderness areas, where no individual may be
able to establish material injury. Or there may be serious conflicts
between the interests of those suffering immediate material injury and
other, more remotely involved interests that should nonetheless be
considered. Problems of [this sort are] likely to be generated by governmental policies that have important effects on the preferences and well
being of future generations . .

.87

But liberalization of standing laws in such situations may, he warns, "strain
the logic of representation, and risk turning the courts into 'planning'
88
agencies."
A related problem arises in the attempt to develop an analytic
framework for determining when purely ideological plaintiffs should have
standing. Justice Douglas' dissent in Sierra Club89 hinted at some of the
disturbing distinctions courts might be forced to make if the class allowed to
represent the environment were further expanded: "a fisherman, a canoeist,
must be able to speak for the values which [a]
river represents and which are threatened with destruction.' '90 But "those
a zoologist or a logger

.

.

.

85. Wilkey, Agency Functions in Light of Environmental Problems, 26 AD. L. REv. 143,
144 (1974).

86. Stewart, supra note 81, at 1746. This view is exemplified in the recent decision in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555, 562 (1977),

which reaffirms "that economic injury is'not the only kind of injury that can support a
plaintiff's standing." See generally Jaffe, Ecological Goals and the Ways and Means of
Achieving Them, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1972).
87. Stewart, supra note 81, at 1746-47 (citations omitted)
88. Id. at 1747 (citations omitted). See also Jaffe, supra note 80, at 21-25.
89. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-55 (1972).
90. Id. at 743.
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who merely are caught up in environmental news or propaganda and flock to
defend [certain] waters or areas may be treated differently." 91 Justice
Douglas and several other commentators have suggested that the solution to
this problem is to allow environmental issues to be tendered by the
threatened natural object itself. 92 Other tests could doubtless be formulated
to implement the ideological plaintiff position. 93 The Sax Act proposed at
the federal level, for example, proposes to grant standing to parties who can
"speak knowingly for the environmental values asserted in a particular
case." 94 One difficulty with such proposals is that considerable judicial
resources might have to be expended to determine the capacity of the
ideological plaintiff to represent particular interests or to secure some
representation for interests which the surrogate chose not to represent. 95
B.

Is the Citizen Environmental Suit Cost-Effective?

As has been seen, there is evidence of a need for greater public
involvement in environmental management and some indication that the
courts can play a role in fulfilling this need. 96 But further research is needed
to determine whether the citizen suit is the best available vehicle. Even if it
can be established that the citizen suit can serve a legitimate and useful
function in environmental policy-making, an important question remains as
to whether there are more cost-effective methods for accomplishing the
same objectives.
1. Basic Objectives of Citizen Involvement. The basic objectives of
those urging reform fall into two main categories: improving the quality of
environmental decision-making and expanding the role of private citizens in
managing the nation's resources. In order to assess alternative forms of
citizen participation and to determine which can achieve these possibly
incompatible goals most effectively, it is first necessary to define each
objective more precisely.
Several conceptions of what would constitute a "qualitative improvement in environmental decision-making" can be gleaned from the literature.
According to various views, the quality of environmental decision-making
can be improved if:
91. Id. at 752.
92. Id. at 741-52; see Stone, supra note 10.
93. One may ask, for example, whether standing for the ideological plaintiff is necessary to

protect an identifiable interest.
94. See S. 1104, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also Hearings on the Environmental

ProtectionAct of 1970 (S. 3575) Before the Subcomm. on Energy, NaturalResources, and the
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings on the
EnvironmentalProtectionAct of 1971 (S. 1032) Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
95. See Stewart, supra note 81, at 1744 n.360, 1746; Hughes, supra note 10, at 319-22.
96. See Section I supra.
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(a)

environmental values are heavily weighted in the decision
process so that the environment "wins" in competition with
other values ;97
(b) decisions are made after comprehensive consideration of environmental factors;98
(c) a greater number of the interest groups concerned about the
results of decision-making are satisfied with decisions;
(d) the actual processes of decision-making, particularly those
which are unrefined, legally questionable, or highly subjective, are exposed to public scrutiny;
(e) decisions are made expeditiously;
(f) decisions are made at a level which allows for comprehensive
environmental analysis.
As to the second objective, an expansion of the role of private citizens
in environmental management can be effectuated in several ways:
(a) by allowing greater numbers of citizens (indeed, all who
would be interested if they were aware of the environmental
implications of a decision) to present their positions before a
decision is made;
(b) by promoting increased citizen satisfaction after decisions are
made;
(c) by involving not more, but "more informed" citizens-those
who are knowledgeable about environmental matters or who
"speak for" the environment;
(d) by improving lines of communication to administrative officials so that more citizen contributions are understood and
processed by agency officials.
2. The Range of Alternatives. Environmentalists have recently come
to rely heavily on the adversary process as a means of reaching both
objectives, but a wide variety of other participatory approaches have been
suggested in the literature on environmental planning. Some of these have
already been employed, and all need to be recognized before an intelligent
conclusion can be reached about the relative efficacy of litigation measures.
In other words, in order to analyze the necessity of litigation provisions, one
97. See Catalano & DiMento, Local Government Response to State EnvironmentalImpact
Assessment Requirements: An Explanation and a Typology, 7 ENVT'L L. 25, 33-34 (1976);
Wandesforde-Smith, supra note 2, at 481. This may be a most ambitious goal, since for some
environmentalists "winning" appears to have a different meaning that it has for other interest
groups. For such individuals, Professor Wandesforde-Smith has noted, "winning is an all-ornothing proposition because wilderness values are irreplaceable and priceless; not the kind of
values that can be traded-off under the rubric of multiple use or according to the principles of
professional forestry." Id. See notes 159-62 infra and accompanying text.
98. The definition of "consideration" employed here was dramatically presented in Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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must first assess the range of "competitive" forms of environmental decision-making which would also involve concerned citizens.
At the federal level, several agencies currently provide special procedural guarantees which enable interested citizens to participate in their
rule-making processes. The Interstate Commerce Commission's Office of
Rail Public Counsel and the Offices of the Consumer Advocate at the Civil
Aeronautics Board and the Postal Rate Commission, for example, have all
institutionalized means of offering broad representation for citizen interests
in the federal bureaucracy. 99 Perhaps the most widely heralded reform is that
provided for in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Act,t1° which provides for radically expanded citizen participation in certain
rule-making procedures. 101 Among the innovations included in the Act are
02
mandatory public hearings in trade regulation rule-making procedures,
opportunity for examination and cross-examination of witnesses by parties,10 3 opportunity to offer rebuttal testimony, t°4 and a requirement that
trade regulation rules meet a substantial evidence test. 10 5 In addition, the
Magnuson-Moss Act creates a fund to provide for participation by those
who represent interests not already included in the rule-making proceedings. 0 6 Any party with a material interest who lacks the resources to
participate effectively may be reimbursed for a wide variety of costs neces07
sary for active involvement, including attorney fees and costs of studies.'
99.

For a description and discussion of the potential benefits and limitations of these

offices, see Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 18, at 402-06.
100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(h)l (West Supp. 1976). Experience under this act is discussed in
Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 18, at 407-09.
101. See Popper, The New FTC Rulemaking Proceeding:A Guide to Effective Participation,
3 BARRISTER 57, 58 (1976).
102. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 57a(b), (c) (West Supp. 1976).
103. 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(d) (5) (1976).
104. Id.
105. U.S.C.A. §§ 57a(e) (3) (A), (B) (West Supp. 1976).
106. Id. § 57a(h); 16 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1976). But see Lenny, supra note 2, at 508: "Those who
offer a different perspective but who make no new factual presentations have been denied
fees."
107. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(h) (1) (West Supp. 1976). Under the so-called "American Rule,"

attorney's fees are not generally recoverable by the prevailing litigant, including the litigant
acting as a private attorney general, absent specific statutory authorization. See Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Numerous federal statutes do
provide for fee recovery in public interest litigation. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AWARDS OF ATrORNEY'S FEES IN FEDERAL COURTS AFTER Alyeska 13-16

(1976), reprinted in Hearingson S. 2715 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practicearid
Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 325-28 (1976). See also
the proposed rules which would provide financial assistance to participants in Environmental
Protection Agency rulemaking, adjudicatory or enforcement proceedings, 42 Fed. Reg. 1492
(1977), and the decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission not to initiate a program of
financial assistance to indigent participants in administrative proceedings in the absence of
express statutory authority to do so. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Financial Assistance to
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Participation can vary from simple submission of written comments to
108
development of the basic issues in the proceedings.

A number of legal innovations for increasing citizen involvement in
administrative activities have also been developed at the state level. The
Public Council is one such mechanism which has been applied fairly
widely. 10 9 The institutionalization of consumer and environmental advocates in states' attorneys' offices is another.11 0 Procedural guarantees under
state environmental impact assessment statutes and a judicial trend toward

forcing agencies to consider environmental analyses in their decisions provide further evidence of reform in the field of state environmental law.11
Suggestions for improved decision-making have also come from out-

side the legal profession, stressing the need for broad participation and
social experimentation. While it may be difficult to adapt certain theoretically acceptable models to the environmental decision-making arena, 11 2 the
ideas of modern social planners deserve some attention. This is particularly
true because of the sharp opposition of these theorists to the case-by-case
decision model which characterizes the adversary system in the administrative and judicial contexts. Called by various names-transactive plan-

ning,"' future responsive societal learning

14--

these ideas generally pro-

ceed from the premise that the complexity and importance of the problems

facing society are so great that it is disingenuous and even dangerous to
Participants in Commission Proceedings-Statement of Considerations Terminating Rulemaking (Nov. 12, 1976) discussed in Comment, NRC Declines to Fund Indigent Participantsin
Agency Proceedings, 7 ENVT'L L. REP. 10010 (1977).
108. See Popper, supra note 101, at 62 n.12.
109. See Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 18, at 405-07.
110. Id. Citizen advisory groups often supplement these efforts. In California, for example,
a number of specialized citizens' task forces have been created to advise the state Attorney
General on appropriate action to be taken with regard to a variety of matters, including
environmental quality.
111. For an analysis of this trend and its implications in California, see Catalano & DiMento, supra note 97. See generally Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 263 n.8, 502 P.2d 1049,
1059 n.8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 n.8 (1972) ("if the adverse consequences to the environment
can be mitigated, or if feasible alternatives are available, the proposed activity, such as the
issuance of a permit, should not be approved"); Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal. App.
3d 322, 326, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568, 570 (1975) (indicating that reasons for rejection of adverse
recommendations of an environmental impact review must be given). But as to the substantive
impact of the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12600-12612 (West
Supp. 1977), see Breshahan v. City of Pasadena, 48 Cal. App. 3d 297, 121 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1975)
(review of decision is limited to determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion). On
the substantive impact of the National Environmental Policy Act and state acts modeled on
NEPA, see D. HAGMAN. URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW §§ 287-289
(Supp. 1975).
112. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex
Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111,150-64 (1972).
113. J. FRIEDMANN, RETRACKING AMERICA: A THEORY OF TRANSACTIVE PLANNING (Anchor
Books ed. 1973).
114. D. MICHAEL, ON LEARNING TO PLAN-AND PLANNING TO LEARN (1973).
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115
contend that any one group of experts can fashion adequate solutions.
Diverse interests must work together to define, assess and respond to
society's problems. According to this view, individual citizens must be
accorded a broader role in the planning process, and changes must be made
not incrementally but after "systematic examinations of the long range
interactions of a technology with the rest of societal activity."' 116 Ad hoc
approaches such as that of the adversary system are faulted because they are
conservative and resistant to change and because their individualized de117
cision-making processes are not conducive to a holistic perspective.
Social planning theory makes strong conceptual arguments-largely unapplied-for a more decentralized decision-making process in which individuals can experiment and evaluate information about proposed technological
118
changes, judge their implications and propose new directions.
Other suggested reforms are legal-behavioral in nature. For such law
reforms as citizen environmental suit provisions to be most effective, the
advocates and utilizers of these legislative innovations must recognize and
respond to the constraints under which administrative agencies operate. 119
Advocates of change should identify those administrators who will be
critical to organizational response: those who suggest official agency
analysis of environmental bills, those who are responsible for preparing
defenses to citizen suits, and those who decide whether the agency should
affirmatively employ causes of action upon which the citizen suits are
based. If environmentalists are to influence the shaping of policy, interaction with these critical actors must be continuous and reinforcing. Citizen
suits brought without a thorough understanding of agency dynamics may
result in narrow individual victories, but any real effect on policy will be
115.
116.

See J. FRIEDMANN, supra note 113, at xvi-xvii.
Address by Donald M. Michael, "Technology Assessment in an Emerging World" at I

(Oct. 25, 1976) (presented to the Second Int'l Cong. on Technology Assessment, at Univ. of
Michigan). For a classic comparison and explication of incrementalist and comprehensive

decision-making models, see Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. AD. REV.
79 (1959). A discussion of the need for experimentation in social planning and the problems to
be encountered in such endeavors can be found in A COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION: A METHOD FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATING
SOCIAL INTERVENTION (1974). See also The Technology Assessment Act of 1972, 2 U.S.C. §§
471-481, 42 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. IV 1974).
117. Address by Donald M. Michael, supra note 116:
[There is] a growing appreciation that societal survival requires a systems perspective, an ecological perspective, a holistic perspective . . . .A disjointed incrementalist approach simply won't do, though that message, while increasingly recognized
in principle, has been excruciatingly slow to be realized in practice.
Id. at 3. See also D. MICHAEL, supra note 114, at 4.
118. See Address by Donald M. Michael, supra note 116.
119. For discussions of the factors involved in promoting effective lawmaking and some

specific suggestions for environmental reform, see H.

JONES, THE EFFICACY OF LAW

J. DIMENTO, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: A LEGAL AND BEHAVIORAL
(1976), respectively. Also see text accompanying notes 128-31 infra.

(1969) and

PERSPECTIVE
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limited unless those interested in agency decisions involve themselves
continuously in agency affairs.
From the government perspective, citizen environmental litigation may
be a vehicle through which agency administrators can identify new constituencies in their decision-making fields. 2 0 By working with newly recognized environmental interest groups, administrators can develop aggressive
and comprehensive approaches to natural resource management. An adverse
judgment in a citizen suit may cause an agency to restructure its operations
so as to redirect attention from individual adjudication toward long-range
environmental planning which enlists the aid of new and previously underrepresented citizen groups.
3. Factorsin the Cost-efficiency Calculus:Areas for Research. Can
any of these participatory approaches-from the pragmatic, institutionalized
advocacy model of the lawyers to the idealistic "transactive" forms
suggested by some planners-achieve the same objectives that might be
realized through citizen-initiated litigation? Specification of the range of
goals which environmentalists seek 121 suggests that no one form of involvement is likely to be completely satisfactory. It appears impossible, for
example, to structure citizen participation so as to achieve simultaneously
both the predominance of environmental values in agency decision-making
and the consideration of all the views of citizens who wish to be heard. In
large part, the ranking of various strategies for achieving environmental
goals through citizen participation will depend on the values and concerns of
the evaluator. Regardless of the objectives sought, several areas of inquiry
are relevant in judging the relative efficacy of public participation strategies.
Intrusiveness of the mode of participation. Studies of citizen participation in environmental planning indicate that decisions which are acceptable to concerned citizens can be reached using forms of involvement which
are less intrusive than the citizen suit. In one such study, the analysts
conclude that "when citizens participated in public hearings, a large majority of the cases resulted in the final plan representing social values and
objectives, being the most technically efficient of all the alternatives, and
data gathered on the plan's
being finally implemented; in addition, the
122
impact were complete and representative."'
Citizen satisfaction. Studies by social psychologists suggest that the
perception of control over a source of psychological stress can be a valuable
asset in limiting the negative effects of the stress. 12 3 Bureaucratic frustration
120.
121.
122.
123.
Noise,

See J. DIMENTO, supra note 119, at 139.
See Section II. B.I. supra.
J. GOODMAN & E. HANSON, supra note 2, at xxii.
See, e.g. Glass & Singer, Experimental Studies of Uncontrollableand Unpredictable
4 REPRESENTATIVE RESEARCH SOC. PSYCH. no.1, at 165, 175-83 (1973).
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is a form of psychological stress. The point, for purposes of this analysis, is
that even if a particular form of public participation does not have a critical
impact on the decision finally reached, its existence alone may contribute to
greater levels of expressed satisfaction by citizen participants-one of the
objectives of citizen law suits.
However, direct research on the relationship between involvement and
expressed satisfaction has yielded mixed results. For example, a study of
participation in the development of an Army Corps of Engineers improvement project failed to show a correlation between early and continuing
participation by citizens and the amount of public support for the project. 124
Another study, however, has found that participation in environmental
planning efforts through membership on an advisory committee did have a
positive effect on the citizens' belief that their opinions were taken into
consideration by planners.1 25 Interestingly, a similar study found that involvement through public hearings did not have any effect.126
Potential for effecting long-term change. A third area for research
derives from the literature of organizational behavior which strongly suggests that changes in bureaucrats' attitudes and behavior will be short-lived
if no effort is made to influence the groups in which they work. 127 Attempts
to change individual attitudes must involve the actor's "role set," that is,
the cluster of people who significantly influence the actor's behavior on the
job, and not just the individual. 128 The "role set" is the key unit for
achieving organizational change: "To remove a person from his role set, tell
him in a training program or executive interview that he should change his
behavior, and then return him to the unchanged set burdens him with a
double responsibility." 1 29 He must change his own behavior and at the same
time effect complementary changes in the expectations and behavior of his
co-workers. In order to be effective, any effort to involve the public in the
decision-making process must bring public advocates together not just with
individual bureaucrats but with those colleagues to whom the employee's
124.
PUBLIC
125.
126.

Mazmanian, ParticipatoryDemocracy in a FederalAgency, in WATER POLITICS AND
INVOLVEMENT (H. Doerksen & J. Pierce eds. 1976).
J. GOODMAN & E. HANSON, supra note 2, at 56.
Id.
127. See, e.g., P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL
RELATIONS IN Two GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 259-62 (rev. ed. 1963). For a comprehensive
treatment of the literature on approaches to promoting organizational change, see RAPPAPORT,
COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY: VALUES, RESEARCH AND ACTION (1977).
128. R. KAHN et al., ORGANIZATIONAL STRESS: STUDIES INROLE CONFLICT AND AMBIGUITY
396 (1964): "We propose that these difficulties [in creating change] are due in part to the
persistent utilization of the wrong unit for achieving change; the concentration has been on the
individual when it should be on the role set-focal person and role senders." A role sender is one
who sends prescriptive or proscriptive messages to a person whose behavior is the focus of
concern. Id. at 15.
129. Id. at 396-97.
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positions will have to be explained and defended. The administrator named
as a party defendant may be motivated to respond when change is imposed
through litigation for a variety of reasons-out of general societal respect for
judicial mandates, for example-but efforts at change will generally be
more effective if an entire role set is involved. Just as middle-level officials
cannot effect changes without lateral and vertical support, higher-level
change
officials often encounter substantial difficulties in bringing about
130
where they are unable to elicit the support of their subordinates.
This advocacy of interaction among, as opposed to litigation between,
parties with interests in environmental controversies should not be interpreted as suggesting that administrative resistance to environmental goals
will be immediately reduced or that solutions to problems will be readily
achieved. Especially in the turbulent climate of the public sector, where
administrators are subjected to myriad and often incompatible demands,
bringing together potential legal adversaries with strong and sometimes
highly negative perceptions of one another may initially yield undesirable
results. But it is suggested that the discretionary behavior of individuals in
public bureaucracies may be altered more durably through pervasive
changes in the social environment in which they function than through the
edicts of environmental lawsuits. As one leading commentator has described
the situation,
Most administrative agencies act in a highly charged field of political
forces which include the legislature, other executive bodies and officials, and a variety of more or less well-organized political, social and
economic groups and interests. The internal bureaucratic organization,
traditions and expectations of the agency and its personnel are also
major factors in its environment. The policies adopted by the agencies,
the energy and effectiveness with which they are pursued, and the
agency's ultimate impact on the world may all be far more a function of
these factors than the formal apparatus of administrative law."'
To the extent that this view is correct, those faced with a choice among
strategies for achieving environmental objectives must balance the shortrange advantages of control gained through victories in environmental
litigation against the initially less dramatic but perhaps more permanent
influences of other approaches. Institutionalization of citizen environmental
"watch dogs" such as the Federal Council on Environmental Quality should
132
be considered, for example.
Capacity to focus change efforts on points of resistance. Another
difficulty with the adversary process as employed in citizen environmental
130.
131.

P. BLAU, supra note 127, at 207-08.
Stewart, supra note 81, at 25.

132. See Krier, supra note 2.
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suits is that it may fail to discriminate sufficiently among targets which
environmentalists wish to influence. Litigation may preclude identification
of individuals or entire bureaus within an agency which are highly sympathetic to environmental objectives.133 Components of agencies subjected
to law suits are often quite diverse, and pro-environment orientations may
be more prevalent than environmentalists generally believe. 134 Many agency
managers sincerely consider themselves to be the original environmentalists, and attacks on their efforts to promote environmental interests are
surprising to them. One case in point involved the administrative impact of
vigorously pursued environmental litigation brought in Michigan under
MEPA. 135 One state agency, the Department of Natural Resources, which
had been supportive of MEPA throughout its development, was sued soon
after passage of the act by plaintiffs challenging a land use decision made by
the department. Attitudes toward the act were affected by the suit. As one
agency official stated:
I accept [the suit] now reluctantly; I don't believe it's right. The thing
that tore my guts out is for me to be fighting with another environmentalist. For someone to accuse me of not being an environmentalist! This
is the only . . . thing I got going for me. I [made a decision] after
sleepless nights based on what I thought was best for the environment.
I get questioned all the time, 'You son of a bitch, how can you do this?'
by people who pick you apart because they are ignorant of the
36
circumstances.1
His opinion was not isolated. Many in the department who had been
involved in litigation became disillusioned with MEPA. 1 37
Since this particular department was defendant in several citizen
suits,1 38 such attitude changes might have been expected to develop. But
133. In litigation, an agency typically will present a united front. But it is not uncommon for
different components of the same agency to have diametrically opposed policy views. For one
classic study detailing how one component of an agency may be highly sympathetic to environmental values while others are not, see P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 85-213 (Torchbook ed. 1966).

134. See, e.g., Wandesforde-Smith, supra note 2, at 479-80:
The majority of agency personnel are sincere and dedicated public servants, giving
administrative expression to the public interest as they see it . . . . They do not
particularly like being told they have done a less than adequate job in the past. And
the kind of criticism is especially unpalatable when it comes from groups, such as the
Sierra Club, that make claims on the public's attention in the name of conservation.
After all, it was the men who first provided political and administrative leadership to
resource management as a public function who first popularized the term conservation in the United States.
135. For a detailed report on the situation described below, see J. DIMENTO, supra note 119,
at 108.
136. Id.
137. Attitudes toward the statute were investigated by means of interviews. The methodology for that study is described in id. at 14-21.
138. During MEPA's first three years this state agency had been the defendant in 14 cases
under MEPA. Id. at 55-56. Haynes reports recent use of MEPA by the same department as a
plaintiff. Haynes, supra note 26, at 622.

Vol. 1977:409]

CITIZEN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION

437

interviews with agency personnel indicated that negative attitudes toward
citizen environmental litigation were the result of concern over the types of
cases being brought 139 and the treatment of agency personnel in the courtroom rather than of any negative reaction to citizen suits per se:
You know. . . honestly. . . I was raised as a scientist and you know
objectively if you want to get at a problem you never tell anybody to
shut up. To me the [legal] system is wrong. For somebody to tell me to
shut up when I'm telling them what happened, that's completely
foreign to anything I've been raised on . . . . It's really a matter of
40
matching wits of lawyers.'
One comment by a front-office official in this agency is of particular interest
in evaluating the relative benefits of the participatory and adversary methods
of citizen involvement:
Hell, I'd like to sit down with them [a coalition of environmentalists]
and ask, 'Now where should we go?' and deliberately plan our way. My
feeling is that I'm sitting here [now] in a kind of detached way ....
Maybe it's my job to coordinate. I don't know. I really haven't made up
my mind. Perhaps I should be out there waving the flag. I feel a certain
hostility [when I'm called] a rubber stamp. Again it's contrary to my
nature-I'm an open guy, and I'd just as soon lay it bare with every141
body . . . . But the world just isn't built that way.
For any method of citizen involvement in public decision-making to be of
continuing value, the private participant must remain cognizant of the
various pressures to which the government is subject and discriminate
between those individual officials who are sympathetic to reform efforts and
those opposed to change.
Opportunity to speak versus opportunity to be heard. Attempts to
evaluate various strategies for citizen participation must also distinguish
between effective communication with administrators and the effects of
presentations made before agency officials." a This distinction between
139. See J. DIMENTO, supra note 119, at 108. ("As a matter of fact ...
concerned about the court situation ... the trends").
140. Id.at 93.
141. Id. at 94-95.

we're a little

142. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), graphically

illustrates the distinction at issue here. The AEC had interpreted section 102(2)(c) of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970), as requiring only that its
staff's "detailed statement" on the environmental impact of a proposed agency action "accompany" the proposal through the hearing process. The Commission did not require, however,
that the statement even be read by the hearing board unless a party to the proceeding had raised

an environmental issue. The court thought this a "ludicrous" interpretation. Congress intended
that the "detailed statement" be considered by the agency in the sense of a "rigorous explora-

tion and objective evaluation" of staff proposals and alternatives. Only this treatment would
satisfy Congress' directive that the environmental impact of agency action be evaluated "to the
fullest extent possible." 449 F.2d at 1117-18.
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presentation and actual communication consideration is particularly important to environmentalists:
[P]ublic interest advocates have tended to scorn resort to rulemaking
proceedings on the ground that participation in such proceedings may
have little impact on agency policy determinations. In notice and comment rulemaking the agency is not bound by the comments filed with it,
and many such comments may be ignored or given short shrift. 143
In addition, presentations to agency personnel seem to be treated in differing
ways by the agency depending on the presenter's prior history of interaction
and the intensity of the message presented." Indeed, some exchanges of
views in public hearings and by written comments bear no resemblance
whatsoever to communication. In litigation, on the other hand, the processing of information introduced by citizens is much more formal: interrogatories and other pretrial proceedings and the structure of the trial itself
compel actual consideration of citizen analyses and presentations. It is, of
course, another question whether such forced attention correlates with
positive response to the information presented absent some substantive,
actively enforced requirement. 145
Professor Jaffe's distinction between simple and complex environmental problems may provide some guidance in evaluating the relative efficacy
of citizen participation strategies:
In such situations [where the problem is a simple one such as what to do
about dumping of mercury into lakes and streams], then, we must have
available the direct and immediate appeal to the courts with their
prestige and high potential for enforcement.
At the other end of the scale is, for example, the problem of
controlling the general pollution of water systems serving densely
populated industrial and commercial areas . . . . [This is a complex
environmental problem requiring the development of a process of
economic and acceptable standards]. . . . It should not require much
argument to demonstrate that the judicial process is not well-suited to
such a task.146
This comment helps to set the previous discussions in context. The varying
strengths and weaknesses of judicial and administrative decision-making
143. Stewart, supra note 81, at 1775.
144. See generally C. INSKO, THEORIES OF ATTITUDE CHANGE 43-00, 161-00, 337 (1967). See
also E. ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 49-87 (1972). The range of the literature in social

psychology on attitude formation and change is immense, but many of the theories cited in the
Insko survey place importance on both the nature of the message and the identity of the
communicator.
145.

C. INSKO, supra note 144, at 223-84.

146. Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REV.
231, 234-35 (1970).
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processes may make various forms of citizen participation more or less
appropriate in responding to particular problems.
Each of the factors that have been presented here must be considered in
evaluating participatory schemes and in attempting to effect the "public
interest." Before proposing a research program that will facilitate this
development, however, it is necessary to examine the concept of the public
interest, since it is that concept against which all discussions of cost
effectiveness must ultimately be measured.
C.

In Whose Interest Is the PublicInterest?

To the extent that environmentalists can be clear about their objectives,
their choices among competing means may be informed by the foregoing
discussion. For the decision-maker, however, environmental considerations
are only one aspect of the context in which policy choices are made. As
several commentators have emphasized, environmentalism and the public
interest are not uniformly equivalent. 147 Environmental values are but one of
several factors which must be considered in governmental decisions. Despite the ascendancy of environmentalism and the increasing number of
public interest advocates (both lawyers and lay persons) who make the
natural environment their primary ward, the conceptual issues raised in
attempting to define and achieve the public interest remain numerous.
The nebulousness of the "public interest" presents a difficult challenge
for those considering reforms in the administrative process and judicial
review of that process. Some environmentalists oversimplify the challenge
by using the term "public interest" quite loosely. 148 The question is often
raised in the legal literature (at times with a very clear indication of the
author's sympathies) whether the "public interest" advocate is merely
another lobbyist hoping to cloak private interests in terminology which
makes his position politically dangerous to oppose. Professor Jaffe has
indirectly raised this point as it relates to the environmental movement:
[T]he conservationist appears to insist that everyone should be required
to take his vacation [in the wild areas of a national park] or otherwise
repair to the already over-crowded places. He set his face against the
multitudes who clamor for more parks and ski resorts which are accessible to those addicted to automobiles. This is an elitist concept which I
can only deplore. There is plenty of room for both kinds of
recreation. 149
147. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 86, at 1-16; Panel !: What is the Public Interest? Who
Represents It?, 26 AD. L. Rev. 385 (1974).
148. One commentator stated flatly that "the courts need to recognize that whereas the
governmental agencies are the representatives of the 'economic' interests, the conservation
groups are more apt to represent the 'public interest.' Tremaine, supra note 10, at 136-37.
149. Jaffe, supra note 86, at 15.
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Another commentator on Canadian environmental matters has concluded
that
[p]articipation from an interested and concerned public usually means
little more than participation from an expanded segment of the middle
class. For the most part, participation in any form will tend to favor the
status quo and oppose change.
Usually the incentive behind participation in any decision is the
desire to protect some vested interest. This is true for both the polluter
and the environmentalist. 5 0
It is not surprising that modern legal commentators and practitioners
have failed to reach a consensus; the problem of defining the public interest
15 1
has historically plagued those in the field of public administration.
Nevertheless, the range of suggested possibilities may be condensed to three
basic models. Each carries different assumptions about the responsibility of
the administrator. At one extreme, there is the view that the public needs to
have its interest articulated by wise public servants, administrative Philosopher Kings. The opposite extreme, based on a mechanistic view of the
bureaucrat, suggests that administrators could produce decisions in the
public interest if they would properly balance conflicting social interests.
This model describes "wondrous engines (including the human mind) into
which are poured all sorts of miscellaneous ingredients which, after a decent
period of gestation, are spewed forth from time to time, each bearing a
union label which reads: 'Made in the Public Interest in the U.S.A.' ",152
The difficulties inherent in conceptualizing the public interest have
been so great that many administrators have sought to leave the problem to
the legal community. 15 3 A third view has arisen in response to this delegation, which holds that the public interest is best defined through the operation of the adversary system in a pluralistic society. As Dean Roger Crampton recently articulated this view, "if the process itself is fair, open and
rational, . . . the outcome is the current expression of the public interest." 15 4 This approach has its shortcomings, and the legal profession may be
able to do better. But the profession may have to live with the limited
150.

Emond, supra note 2, at 783 & n. 1. See also Burch, Who Participates-ASociological

Interpretationof NaturalResource Decisions, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 41 (1976); Hanes, supra
note 2, at 735-39.
151. See, e.g., Schubert, "The Public Interest" in Administrative Decision-Making:

Theorum, Theosophy or Theory?, 51 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 346, 366 (1957): "[lit is by now
apparent that American writers in the field of public administration have evolved neither a

unified nor a consistent theory to describe how the public interest is defined in administrative
decision-making." (Emphasis in original).
152.

Id. at 364.

153. See id. at 346.
154. PanelI: What is the Public Interest? Who Represents It?, supra note 147, at 386.
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conclusion that the courts and administrative agencies are somehow interacting to work toward the actualization of the public interest. It may be
impossible to determine whether the public interest has been satisfactorily
defined, let alone when it has been achieved.
While it may make some students of the administrative process uncomfortable to conclude that standards can be devised to facilitate working
toward an outcome that cannot be clearly defined, a reasonable case can be
made for this position. If that portion of the public which has previously
been unrepresented in agency decision-making can be included in the
decision-making process, many will agree that the decisions will be closer to
the public interest than was the case prior to their inclusion. 155 To conclude
that the public interest may be multifaceted, that it may in fact be a blending
of the numerous and perhaps incompatible positions of several interest
groups, is not to conclude that developing a more just process for its
realization is impossible. As two leading commentators have recently observed, "In a real sense there are many 'publics' deserving to be heard.
Merely to say that a 'public representative' is already a participant should be
an insufficient reason for rejecting additional participants claiming to speak
for different specific 'publics.' "156 Perhaps this is to assert that, at this stage
of the history of our extremely heterogeneous nation, "more is better" in
the field of decision-making. Given the diversity among the possible
strategies for improving environmental management,15 7 inclusion of contributions from a greater variety of perspectives may improve the quality of
analysis.
Positing the desirability of hearing from as many interest groups as
possible presents the problem of choosing who shall be heard when it is too
costly, time-consuming or complex to hear all interested parties. There are
sound and thoughtful theories of justice which can assist administrators and
judges in making the difficult decisions as to what minority rights need
representation in a proceeding. 158 But practical difficulties arise as attempts
155. This is part of the rationale for citizen environmental litigation presented in Section 1I
B.I. supra. See Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 18, at 394 n.10 (comments of William D.

Ruckelshaus).
156. Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 18, at 395. "If the 'public interest' is pluralistic in
nature, as opponents. . . have themselves frequently asserted, there is no inherent reason why
more than one 'public' participant cannot be admitted to a proceeding." Id. at 413.
157. See text accompanying notes 99-120 supra.

158. For example, the operationalization of the "pure procedural justice" described in
general terms by Professor Rawls can be sought more aggressively:

In this complex of institutions, which we think of as establishing social justice in the
modern state, the advantages of the better situated improve the condition of the least
favored. Or when they do not, they can be adjusted to do so, for example, by setting

the social minimum at the appropriate level. As these institutions presently exist they
are riddled with grave injustices. But there presumably are ways of running them
compatible with their basic design and intention so that the difference principle

(which states that the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive
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are made to apply the chosen theory's broad guidelines to decisions relating
to the environment. Part of the controversy over standing, 159 for example,
derives from the absence of groups in the population legally competent to
represent interests which some environmentalists believe to be essential to
the survival of the world ecosystem. 160 In addition, viewing the public
interest as process is wholly unacceptable to thbse who contend that the
world is nearing natural limits beyond which our ecosystem can no longer
survive. 16 1 For obvious reasons, marginal analyses which balance interests
162
have no place in the presentations of such theorists.
D.

The Public Interest as Process: Evaluating the Impact
of Citizen EnvironmentalLitigation

For the great majority of policy-makers, assessment of the utility of the
citizen environmental suit is influenced by the same factors present in many
other areas of policy analysis. All decisions must be made with finite
resources. But most policy decisions are complicated by the fact that to
pursue one set of values is most often to choose against other sets which are
forcefully advocated by other equally important and articulate groups within
the population. The correctness of the decision reached will depend greatly
on the perspective of the evaluator.
Analysis may be aided by articulating some of the trade-offs which
must be considered. In evaluating alternative means of effecting greater
public participation, two issues surface as focal points: how do the
economic costs of the citizen suit compare with costs of citizen participation
earlier in the process, and how does this cost differential compare with the
difference in the degree of realization of environmental reformer's goals?' 63
The conclusion of this type of analysis might be that although the environprospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less

fortunate) is satisfied consistent with the demands of liberty and fair equality of
opportunity.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 87 (1973). See also Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 TermForeword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1

(1973).
159. See text accompanying notes 74-95 supra.
160. See, e.g., White, The HistoricalRoots of Our Ecologic Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203,
1204-07 (1967).
161. See Heller, Coming to Terms with Growth and the Environment, in ENERGY, ECONOMIC

GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENT 3, 4 (S. Schurr ed. 1972).
162. In discussing means of achieving ecological goals, Professor Jaffe has written, "Personally, I can face with equanimity the extinction of one or another species, be it bird of
bacillus of the bubonic plague. Species have died ere this. It may not be worthwhile to spend an
additional $50,000,000 to save $5,000,000 worth of fish." Jaffe, supra note 86, at 235. For the
environmental absolutist, such remarks represent deadly choices, not marginal compromises.
While such thinking may not lead to imminent ecological disaster, the environmentalist may
contend that it augurs an environmental future that not only suffers the opportunity costs of a
road not taken, but forces travel on a highway leading to ultimate collapse of a life system.
163. See notes 63-95 supra and accompanying text.
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mentalists' expressed satisfaction at the end of the public hearing process is
less than that expressed after judicial challenge of an administrative agency
action, this cost to society-this marginal loss of satisfaction-is well worth
bearing in light of the additional expense needed to achieve the marginal
benefit.
Trade-offs must also be made between environmental goals and other
goals which our society considers important. The ramifications of reform
must be considered in terms of the entire judicial and administrative systems. To the extent that citizen environmental suits are being promoted,
what types of litigation are being precluded? To the extent that environmental goals are being met by concentrating administrative energies on administrative decisions, what other activities of the regulatory agencies are being
sacrificed, or pursued with less intensity?
The impact of citizen suit legislation on the administrative agencies and
the courts has not been adequately specified, let alone measured. What is
needed is a comprehensive program of systematic study. The closing section
of this paper presents an outline of such a program.

I.

SOME RESEARCH DIRECrIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Despite all that has been written about the potential impact of citizen
environmental litigation on administrative functions, it should be clear that
some very fundamental questions remain unanswered. Ignorance about the
existence and potential uses of various types of citizen environmental
legislation and about the institutional costs and benefits of environmental
management reforms may result in misguided allocation of the environmental protection workload among the courts, administrative agencies and
legislatures. Lack of information is also reflected in citizen agitation for
reform when legal vehicles for change are already available and in citizens'
frustration at their inability to exert more influence on administrative action.
To build on the empirical and conceptual work that has already been
completed, two major lines of research are suggested for analysis of citizen
suit legislation and its utility relative to other forms of citizen participation.
One of these is legal: the results sought are analyses of the potential
involvement of citizens in environmental management through the judicial
system. Research is currently being conducted"M in several states on the
efficacy of various forms of extra-judicial citizen involvement in environmental planning activities. What is suggested here is a more comprehensive
analysis of citizen suit possibilities under various types of reforms passed or
contemplated by the state legislatures. After identifying laws (other than
general state administrative procedure codes) which provide for citizen suits
164.

See note 2 supra.
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in the environmental arena, research could be guided by the following
questions:
A.. To what extent is each legal provision amenable to citizen use?
(1) What is the theoretical limit of its use?
(2) To what extent have legal obstacles to initiation of suit (e.g.,
standing, security bond requirements or absence of attorney's
fees provisions) or to judicial review (e.g., doctrines of exhaustion of remedies and primary jurisdiction) been
removed?
(3) Is litigation limited to controversies over resources in the
public domain or are challenges to activities on private property permitted?
(4) Will the statutes be read in parimateria with other laws such
as freedom of information provisions and substantive environmental and land use laws? 65
B. What is the legal theory on which the provision is based?
(1) Is there reliance on the public trust doctrine?1 66
(2) Is there reliance on causes of action such as nuisance which
are traditionally available in the jurisdiction?' 67
(3) Is there reliance on non-self-executing constitutional provisions?168 If so, to what extent has the legistature provided
remedies?
165. See Note, Standing to Sue UndertheModel Land Development Code, supra note 10, at
664.
166. See DiMento, Overview 415-16; Juergensmeyer & Wadley, The Common Lands Concept: A "Commons" Solution to a Common EnvironmentalProblem, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J.
361 (1974); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 18. This doctrine has had a variety of interpretations. In general, it states
that actions by government affecting a resource that has historically been used freely by the
general public should be looked upon with considerable skepticism by the courts. Read most
narrowly, the doctrine's coverage extends only to land below the low-water mark on the margin
of the sea and the major lakes, waters over these lands, waters within rivers or streams of any
consequence, and parklands (especially if they have been donated to the public for specific
purposes). But a much broader interpretation is also possible:
Public trust problems are found whenever governmental regulation comes into question, and they occur in a wide range of situations in which diffuse public interests
need protection against tightly organized groups with clear and immediate goals.
[Thus, the doctrine may be] equally applicable and appropriate in controversies
involving air pollution, the dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of way
for utilities, and strip mining or wet land filling in private lands in a state where
governmental permits are required.
Id. at 556-57.
Where the doctrine does apply, a court will typically require that a governmental unit have
a specific legislative mandate for any action that will change the use of a resource. Broad
legislative statements about responsibilities of an agency (for example, to build roads) will not
be interpreted as authority for drastic changes in the use of resources that the government holds
in trust for the people (for example, filling a public pond in order to complete the road).
167. See generally Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 86-91 (4th ed. 1971).

168. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 382 n. 181 and accompanying text.
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C.

To what extent is each provision also amenable to use by parties
other than private citizens?
(1) Are causes of action created for state agencies, cities, counties and other legal jurisdictions?
(2) Are actions available to private corporations?
(3) To the extent that these extensions have been made, how
have previously available rights and remedies been
expanded?
The second line of research suggested is in the sphere of social science,
particularly organizational behavior. Studies of law in action are needed. To
prevent some of the costly debates which arise when citizen environmental
legislation is initially considered or when amendments or repeals of reform
legislation are proposed, all parties involved require more accurate information on the relative effects of the various reform proposals on the judicial
and administrative processes. To fulfill this need, systematic research is
169
required on the following questions:
A.

JudicialAdministration
(1) What is the effect of citizen suit legislation on court
170
caseloads?
(2) Relative to the administrative agencies which have traditionally dealt with environmental issues, how well equipped is the
judiciary to analyze the value-laden controversies presented
by citizen environmental suits?
(3) Do the judicial procedures to which controversies are subjected expedite or impede rapid and equitable environmental
decision-making?
(4) What percentage of citizen environmental suits do presiding
judges classify as frivolous or harassing?
(5) Generally, what are some of the unanticipated results of
citizen suit legislation?

B.

Agency Administration
(1) What is the effect of citizen environmental legislation on the
planning ability of administrative agency staffs?
(2) What is the impact on the regulatory effectiveness of the unit?
(3) How do citizen environmental suits affect the utility of the
traditional administrative procedures of conference and conciliation as a means of solving environmental controversies?
(4) What utility do citizen suit laws have for government
agencies?

169. A research proposal entitled "Citizen Environmental Legislation: Potential Use of the
Citizen Suit and Perceived and Actual Institutional Impact" has been submitted to a national
funding source. It covers, in three phases of analysis, several of the lines of inquiry presented in
this section.

170. Some early data are presented in Section I supra.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1977:409

(a) If an agency or local government unit is authorized to be a
plaintiff in an environmental suit, to what extent is this
authority utilized?
(b) Are there situations where being a defendant in a citizen
suit can actually help an agency to reach its goals?
(5) Are there certain types of environmental controversies which
government agencies subject to environmental suits consider
themselves incapable of resolving, either because of lack of
expertise of lack of authority?
(6) Generally, what are some of the unanticipated effects of
citizen suits on the administrative process?
Information is also needed on the economic and psychological effects
of the citizen suit:
A. Economic
(1) What are the direct economic costs of citizen suits?
(a) Attorneys fees and court costs?
(b) Public costs of the time and facilities for judges and other
judicial officials?
(c) Private research undertaken in preparation for suits?
(d) Costs to the government or private parties in defending
citizens' suits?
(2) What are the indirect costs?
(a) Is there any significant relationship between promotion of
strong economic controls and industry location decisions?
(b) To what extent are industry threats backed by actual
171
movement?
B. Psychological
(1) To what extent are citizens aware of the potential for their
involvement in environmental decision-making under various
statutory provisions?
(2) To what degree do members of the public, as opposed to
public interest groups or lawyers, actually become involved in
environmental lawsuits?
(3) What are citizens' motivations for initiating or intervening in a
suit, and, where the citizen is a defendant, what are his or her
perceptions of the plaintiffs' motivations?
(4) Do citizens actually learn of the judgments in environmental
suits and scrutinize the extent to which the judgment is carried out?
(5) To what degree do citizens find satisfaction in their involve171. A similar problem has been experienced with local tax structures. There is an argument, for example, that high taxes are forcing industry out of the industrial Northeast to the
South and Southwest, but little movement is actually reflected by the economic indicators. See
Blaydon & Gilford, Financingthe Cities:An Issue Agenda, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1057, 1094 n. 158.
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ment in environmental lawsuits and the results of such suits
as opposed to other means of participation?
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A number of states have adopted various approaches in attempting to
introduce public participation into administrative agency actions which
affect the environment. Several have legislated substantive and procedural
reforms to increase citizens' environmental rights and powers. These reforms vary from general causes of action which can be utilized to challenge
a broad range of public and private actions that allegedly degrade the
environment to narrowly drafted statutes which allow for judicial review of
administrative agency actions in selected circumstances after the citizen has
met specified procedural prerequisites.
Despite considerable legislative analysis of several types of citizen suit
bills, voluminous legal commentary and some empirical research on the
impact of passage and use of the legal reforms, there remains much room for
debate on the advisability of such laws. Several reasons explain the absence
of definitive answers to questions about the consequences of citizen suits.
These include, first, difficulties in performing empirical research for investigation of the arguments on both sides of the issue: second, conceptual
difficulties in defining the true benefits and costs of proposed reforms; and
third, the highly value-laden nature of the controversy. 172 Suggestions have
been made to meet some of these difficulties by means of legal and
organizational research.
With or without additional research, legislatures and policy analysts
contemplating changes in state law governing citizen suit rights must also
consider the implications of proposed changes for participation in a democratic society. Increasing the power of private citizens to challenge specified
administrative agency actions-or as some of the reforms have been described, providing for private attorneys general--can promote elitism and
contribute to a myopic decentralization of environmental decision-making.
These effects are contrary to the idea of a government of majority power and
minority protection. Yet evaluation of a new environmental tool must be
made in the context not of democracy in theory, but democracy in operation.
Those who think about legislating broad citizen rights for environmental
protection perhaps are not being too cynical when they point to widespread
manifestations of our failure to implement democratic principles. Not the
least of these manifestations is the attenuated nature of the representation
which results from delegation of decision-making responsibility to administrative officials in regulatory areas which are complex, new and seemingly
172. For a particularly insightful discussion of this area, see B.
UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

(1974).

ACKERMAN,
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not susceptible to resolution by means of a single disciplinary perspective.
Fragmentation and impersonality also characterize the administrator's resolutions of problems which are complex and multifaceted and which affect
large numbers of people in a variety of ways. Although these attributes are
accepted by some as inevitable concomitants of bureaucratization in a
democratic society, this understanding does not justify the result. To put all
this in less abstract terms, those considering policy reforms in environmental management will have to consider whether political and organizational
constraints on decision-making are so great as to make democratic participation a practical impossibility.
What, for example, is the democratic response to the following situation? A municipality in a state requiring consistency between zoning ordinances and general plans has decided that its industrial and allegedly
exclusionary residential zoning are consistent with its general plan that
promises and promotes both equal housing opportunity and environmental
quality. The residents of the municipality concur periodically by electing
those who support this analysis. Is it undemocratic to deny a challenge to
that finding of consistency-perhaps on environmental grounds-by a private citizen in another community? By one who lives in a community
allegedly suffering from industrial pollution originating in the subject
municipality? By one who lives in the municipality? By one who would live
in the municipality and participate in the electoral process if housing were
supplied within his or her means? Providing for citizen suits to enforce
consistency in such a set of circumstances may be to promote the power of
those who remember best the major premises of democratic theory.
One of the means of developing better answers to the questions which
have been summarized in this article is through careful analysis of the
natural experiment which now exists in this country. As was noted at the
beginning of this section, states have responded in several different ways to
requests for expanded citizen environmental roles. By observing the effects
of these extant legislative changes on the courts, on the administrative
agencies, on citizens, and ultimately, if possible, on the natural environment
itself, we may be able to come up with more satisfying responses to the
challenge of the environmental movement. As a by-product, we may also
learn which institutional decision-making processes move us more satisfactorily toward realization of the public interest.

